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Abstract
Human resources are the most important assets of any health system, and health workforce
problems have for decades limited the efficiency and quality of Latin America health systems. World
Bank-led reforms aimed at increasing equity, efficiency, quality of care and user satisfaction did not
attempt to resolve the human resources problems that had been identified in multiple health sector
assessments. However, the two most important reform policies – decentralization and
privatization – have had a negative impact on the conditions of employment and prompted
opposition from organized professionals and unions. In several countries of the region, the
workforce became the most important obstacle to successful reform.
This article is based on fieldwork and a review of the literature. It discusses the reasons that led
health workers to oppose reform; the institutional and legal constraints to implementing reform as
originally designed; the mismatch between the types of personnel needed for reform and the
availability of professionals; the deficiencies of the reform implementation process; and the
regulatory weaknesses of the region.
The discussion presents workforce strategies that the reforms could have included to achieve the
intended goals, and the need to take into account the values and political realities of the countries.
The authors suggest that autochthonous solutions are more likely to succeed than solutions
imported from the outside.
Introduction
Health reforms that aim at increasing efficiency, quality
and users' satisfaction need to take into consideration
human resource issues, because the health sector is labor-
intensive and the performance of health systems depends
on qualified and motivated workers [1-4]. At the same
time, the support of the workforce is crucial to ensure suc-
cessful implementation of reforms.
In Latin America, the need to improve the performance of
the workforce had been pointed out in many health sector
assessments conducted in the 1970s and 1980s by the
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), the World Bank (WB), other agencies and inde-
pendent researchers. (See for Argentina [5-7], for Bolivia
[8-10], for Brazil [11], for Chile [7,12], for Colombia [12-
14], for Costa Rica [15], for the Dominican Republic [16-
18], for Ecuador [19,20], for El Salvador [21], for
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Guatemala [22,23], for Mexico [12,24-26], for Nicaragua
[27], for Panama [28,29], and for Uruguay [7].)
From these reports and studies, and notwithstanding the
differences among the countries in the region, we can
summarize the problems present during the 1970s and
1980s as follows:
• The skill mix of health personnel was often inadequate
to meet the needs of the communities, and highly quali-
fied staff often performed tasks that could be conducted
by less-trained providers. The health systems of the region
were characterized by an excess number of medical spe-
cialists and insufficient numbers of other professionals
such as primary care providers, nurses, pharmacists, pub-
lic health specialists, epidemiologists, health economists,
accountants, social workers, administrators, communica-
tion experts, planners, health educators, nutritionists,
physical therapists and sanitary engineers;
• There was an over-concentration of qualified health per-
sonnel in hospitals and urban centers, coupled with short-
ages in poor neighborhoods and rural areas;
• A large majority of physicians held at least two jobs, one
in the government and one in the private sector. In coun-
tries with fragmented health systems, physicians could
even have three jobs: they worked part time for the social
security institute, they worked for the ministry of health,
and also held a private practice. Dual or triple employ-
ment generated conflicts of interests; physicians used the
public sector to draw patients for their private practice,
and their productivity in the public post was low and
absenteeism high;
• Human resources management systems were weak,
largely due to dispersal of accountability: in many coun-
tries the terms and conditions of employment were under
the control of the public service commission or the minis-
try of finance, and the education of human resources was
under the control of the ministry of education or the pri-
vate sector. Ministries of health did not have any input in
determining the types and number of persons to be
trained, and their involvement in hiring and managing
the health workforce was limited. Health managers han-
dled relations with the labor unions, had some limited
supervisory roles, ensured organizational adherence to
recruitment policies, and were responsible for some
training.
• Salary increases were generally based on years of service.
In the majority of countries, central labor unions negoti-
ated working conditions directly with governments and
signed collective agreements that left administrators with
little room to compensate workers according to
performance;
• Personnel decisions (hiring and promotion) were too
often guided by favoritism, political dictates, and
nepotism;
• Health professionals were insufficiently committed to
the public system due to the conflict of interests men-
tioned above, poor personnel management systems and
the perception that wages were low;
• The medical profession strongly dominated the defini-
tion of health sector policies and the regulation of the
conditions of practice of all health professions;
• Communication between providers and patients was
poor, and providers and service users had very different
social and cultural backgrounds. In countries with Amer-
indian-speaking populations, providers did not speak
their languages;
• The regulation of training institutions and conditions of
practice was weak;
• The training of health promoters and other auxiliary per-
sonnel such as dental assistants, midwives, laboratory
technicians, equipment maintenance and repair techni-
cians, and pharmacy clerks was poor or non-existent, thus
their performance was poor.
According to the literature reviewed, these conditions led
to low productivity and efficiency; inadequate equipment;
shortages of supplies and drugs; unmotivated and inade-
quately trained staff; questionable quality of care; and low
users' satisfaction.
By the mid-1970s, the need to reform the human compo-
nent of the health services was very urgent, and the
urgency increased with the severe economic downturn
that countries of the region suffered during in the early
1980s. The size of the Latin America health labor force
(about nine million [30]) implied that reformers attempt-
ing to resolve the human resources problems mentioned
above needed to dedicate a large amount of time and
resources to it.
This paper reviews the impact of the health reforms car-
ried out under the leadership of the World Bank. Data
come from a review of the literature including the leading
Latin American and non-Latin American journals, mono-
graphs, documents found in ministries and reform offices,
technical reports, papers presented at conferences and
fieldwork carried out by the authors between 1980 and
the present in Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, DominicanHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and
Peru.
The World Bank's neoliberal health sector 
reforms
In the early 1980s, with a few exceptions, countries in the
region entered a severe economic downturn. The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank required – as a
condition for new lending and for refinancing the debts –
reduction of public spending. The impact of structural
adjustment programs on health services was severe and
compromised the ability of governments to maintain the
physical infrastructure of the facilities, provide the neces-
sary supplies and equipment, and maintain competitive
salaries for the workforce.
The World Bank took advantage of this situation to pro-
vide loans to the ministries of health and social security
funds. Together with the loans, the Bank offered guide-
lines for the reorganization of the health services accord-
ing to the ideological economic principles held by the
institution.
The World Bank had started its activities in the health sec-
tor in the early 1970s, and by the early 1990s it was the
world's largest health sector lender. In 1999, the total
accumulated value of health, nutrition, and population
loans worldwide amounted to USD 16.8 billion (in 1996
dollars) [31]. By the late 1980s, the Bank placed health
financing at the center of its health policy dialogue with
borrowers. In 1987 the Bank proposed four changes [32]:
to impose user fees at government facilities; introduce
insurance or other risk coverage systems; use nongovern-
mental resources more effectively; and decentralize plan-
ning, budgeting and purchasing for government health
services [32] A few years later, it looked at the roles of the
government and the market in the health sector, and
described the main components that have guided most
World Bank-led health reform efforts [33]. These princi-
ples were reiterated in 1997 [34].
The underlying principles of the Bank-led reforms include
the belief that the private sector is more efficient than the
public sector, and that decentralized administrative units
are better-equipped to respond to the needs of the popu-
lation than centralized governments. The Bank also pro-
poses to limit government financing to a basic package of
services, to be determined for each country by cost-effec-
tiveness studies and the country's ability to pay. Services
included in the basic package are made available at no
cost to the indigent population; governments and the rest
of the population subsidize them. In the Bank's health
reform model, the role of the state is limited to that of a
regulator of the health care market. The United States
health system is closer to the World Bank model than the
national health services or social security funds of other
industrial nations.
The World Bank-led reforms did not include strategies to
correct the human resources problems presented earlier,
even if some of them had been identified by Bank-spon-
sored studies; the World Bank reformers believed that
market forces would resolve them. As we will see, the con-
trary occurred and privatization and decentralization had
some negative consequences for the workforce. The reli-
ance on the market also hid the structural problems that
needed to be taken into account at the time reformers
designed human resource policies. The design and imple-
mentation process which were characterized by secrecy,
generated dissatisfaction among health workers.
We have organized our analysis of human resources dur-
ing the reforms under five categories: resistance of the
workforce to the implementation of a market-oriented
health care model; faulty implementation processes; inad-
equately trained personnel in managerial positions and in
service delivery; institutional and legal dimensions
including insufficient and faulty information, lack of
financial resources, and civil service statutes; and weak
regulatory legislation to ensure the quality of profession-
als and the performance of the sector.
Resistance to the implementation of a market-
oriented health care model
The neoliberal health reforms intended to change the val-
ues that had inspired the Latin American systems and the
relations between the government and the health work-
force. Thus, health would no longer be considered a right;
only the insured would be entitled to receive a broad array
of services. Health workers would lose the protection they
had enjoyed as public servants and become part of a flex-
ible workforce (Table 1).
Humans tend to resist change, but opposition to health
reform was compounded by conflicts with the value sys-
tem that inspired it. Most Latin American constitutions
Table 1: Resistance of the workforce to a market-oriented health 
care model
a. Health is not a right, and the reformed system is no longer based on 
the principles of solidarity and access to health care.
b. Health workers become part of a flexible workforce and are 
encouraged to compete, instead of collaborate, among themselves.
c. Worker unions lose power to influence the system and negotiate 
work conditions of behalf of affiliates.
d. The reform is an abdication of the responsibilities of the 
government to protect the population.
e. Physicians fear losing their professional autonomy.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
Page 4 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
recognize health as a right and most governments had
adopted Alma Ata's primary health care principles as their
strategy to promote Health for All. Health policies were
based on the principle of solidarity and fostered coopera-
tion among health workers and also between them and
other workers in related sectors such as education and
agriculture [35]. It was assumed that health workers
would do the best for their clients out of a sense of per-
sonal duty [4].
Human resource changes were needed to implement
Alma Ata, but the budget reductions required by the
World Bank caused a significant deterioration of working
conditions. As their purchasing power worsened, health
workers intensified undesirable behaviors to increase
their income. These included levying illegal fees, diverting
patients from the public sector to their private clinics [15],
using public supplies and equipment for personal profit
[36], and reducing their productivity in the public sector
[15].
As indicated, Latin American physicians have supple-
mented their income from the public system by means of
their private practice. Physicians value the stability and
fringe benefits of a public post, but as the public delivery
system deteriorated in many countries, private clients
became their main source of revenue. By the late 1980s in
most Latin American countries (with the exception of
Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guate-
mala and Panama), more than half of the health expendi-
tures, including the cost of medicines, occurred in the
private sector [37], and in most countries of the region,
personnel expenditures accounted for about 60% to 70%
of the public health budget [38].
One of the objectives of the neoliberal reforms was to cre-
ate a more flexible labor force by decreasing the number
of tenured public employees and increasing the number
of temporary personnel. This change threatened: the job
security of the civil service, a very important dimension in
countries with little political stability and where workers
are frequently exposed to arbitrary political removals; the
providers' income, which now would depend on their
ability to compete for contracts and clients; and that
which workers expected from their employer (recogni-
tion, opportunities for self-actualization and promotion).
The promoters of health reforms failed to acknowledge
that in a politically unstable region, civil service tenure
was necessary to maintain an efficient, productive, and
loyal labor force. Predictably, these threats triggered the
opposition of professional associations and unions, led to
strikes, and lowered productivity during the reform
process.
Health workers of most countries of the region are union-
ized [39]. The unions protect the workers from the politi-
cization of the appointments and promotions, and their
leaders regularly engage in collective bargaining with the
managers of the public sector. The stability provided by
the civil service status facilitates the formation of strong
union leadership: union leaders remain in office longer
than policymakers.
Labor unions anticipated that the decentralization and
privatization of the sector would have a negative impact
on their membership and their bargaining power. Labor
unions in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Peru and Venezuela expressed their opposition to the
reforms on the grounds that they were an excuse for gov-
ernments to relinquish their constitutional responsibility
to ensure access to care and would lead to dramatic
changes in work conditions [39]. In some countries, such
as El Salvador and Mexico, unionized workers successfully
stalled or delayed the implementation of the reform.
Analysts of the health reform policies agree with the work-
ers' concerns. Segall [4] asserts that a market system does
not nurture the service ethic that should characterize the
workforce and leads providers to adopt self-seeking
behaviors instead of working in the interests of the patient
or the community. Others worry that the uncertainties
generated by the reform, the stress and demands added to
the workforce and the misalignment between the values
of the workers and those of the reformed system are very
detrimental to the workers' motivation [1,40]. According
to Rigoli and Dussault [41] the unions' fears were justi-
fied; union membership appears to have decreased in
recent years.
In addition, health professionals strongly opposed the
idea of having their professional autonomy limited by
professional administrators who would force them to
adhere to diagnostic and treatment protocols based on
economic principles rather than on technical criteria. The
cool reception that Mexican professional associations
offered to foreign insurance companies and health main-
tenance organizations is a good example of this concern
[42].
Table 2: Institutional and legal dimensions
a. Lack of accurate information on the availability of human resources 
and their distribution.
b. Civil service status limits the capacity of managers to change the 
working conditions of personnel.
c. Decentralizing human resources is expensive: homologation of 
salaries and benefits; hiring of additional personnel.
d. Decentralized governments have limited ability to manage 
personnel to respond to the needs of the population.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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Institutional and legal constraints
The large majority of countries in Latin America do not
have accurate information on the numbers and distribu-
tion of the health workforce. There is no centralized entity
responsible for gathering information on the health per-
sonnel practicing in the country or in the different
geographical regions, and even when only public sector
workers are examined, the numbers collected at different
administrative levels differ (people may move to a differ-
ent location, and regional or local governments hire addi-
tional staff without reporting to the central authorities).
The reforms worsened the possibility of having accurate
information. If the system is decentralized and the major-
ity of providers are in the private sector, the sources of
information from which human resources data will need
to be collated multiplies. The challenge may be even
greater if each agency gathers the information differently,
and without this basic information it is very difficult to
engage in human resources development planning (Table
2).
Civil service laws and negotiated agreements with worker
unions have limited the freedom of public sector manag-
ers to reorganize the workforce; managers had to "admin-
ister the rules" [43] issued elsewhere. For instance,
managers could not change the status of public sector
employees to flexible contract workers, dismiss employ-
ees, increase workloads or change the working schedule.
They may also have had difficulties rewarding their
employees because the salaries and the conditions of
employment were set outside the health sector by the
public employment commission, the ministry of labor, or
the ministry of finance or their corresponding decentral-
ized entities. Reformers did not foresee these limitations.
Managers overcame these constraints by hiring additional
personnel under flexible contracts. In Brazil there are now
about 15 different types of contracts for public sector
employees; a significant expansion of the use of tempo-
rary workers and contracts without fringe benefits has
been reported in Argentina [44], Colombia [45], Ecuador
[2], El Salvador [30], Panama and Peru [2]. Funds for the
temporary positions have different origins, including
extrabudgetary government allocations, revenues gener-
ated through user fees, or savings from positions left
empty due to retirements or administrative leaves.
Transferring human resources to other politico-adminis-
trative levels was more difficult than anticipated. Koleh-
mainen-Aitken [46] and Homedes and Ugalde [47] have
suggested that this is the most complex part of the decen-
tralization process. The fear of transfers caused discontent
and anxiety. On the other hand, managers did not want to
absorb everybody who was transferred [46]. The decen-
tralized personnel felt insecure about the new reporting
mechanisms and the new managers' expectations, and
vulnerable to political crossfire.
Decentralizing human resources is expensive. Prior to
decentralization – in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia
and Mexico – local or regional governments frequently
hired additional personnel under different pay scales and
benefit packages than those used by the central govern-
ment. After decentralization, each decentralized adminis-
trative unit had to set pay scales, fringe benefits,
performance assessments and reward systems for its work-
ers. Because it was not possible to lower the salaries and
reduce the benefits of workers with higher salaries and
benefits – generally federal/national workers – it was nec-
essary to bring the salaries and benefits of all the workers
to the level of those who had the most generous package.
Higher salaries and benefits represent an increase in the
fixed costs of the system for an indefinite period.
Moreover, the creation and/or strengthening of the decen-
tralized administrative structures are often not accompa-
nied by a decrease in the number of federal employees,
further raising the costs of personnel to the system [48]. In
Mexico, from 1985 to 1987 the cost of transferring federal
employees to 14 states was 140,000 million pesos
(approximately 452 million US dollars) [49], and in
Colombia the World Bank indicated that the cost of trans-
ferring state and departmental health personnel to Cali's
Municipal Health Secretariat was prohibitive [50].
Decentralization has been promoted under the assump-
tion that the proximity of decision makers to the commu-
nities facilitates providing services more in accordance
with the needs of the community. But the decentralized
structures' ability to respond to local needs has been con-
strained by: the civil servants they inherited, who are often
inadequate in terms of skill mix and geographical distri-
bution; the conditions of employment imposed by other
government sectors and the unions; and the local elite,
who do not have in mind the health needs of the commu-
nities and who lobby to have relatives and friends hired
by local health authorities.
In several countries of the region, decentralization has
broadened the urban-rural inequities in the distribution
of personnel and in the quality of services [51-54]. Rich
decentralized units are able to offer better working
conditions and attract qualified personnel from poorer
municipalities, a sort of brain drain. Similarly, the devel-
opment of the private sector also tends to drain qualified
resources from the public sector [43].
Inadequately trained personnel
Countries considered the human resource implications of
reform only when they faced resistance from the unionsHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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or realized they did not have the financial and human
resources required to implement the reform [55]. The
health reform plan in Costa Rica recognized the ambigu-
ity of the policies and procedures related to human
resources but did not modify them. As planned, incentives
were established to increase workers' productivity and the
use of short-term contracts. These two strategies ended up
triggering greater grievances on the part of public sector
employees [43].
The human resources units of the health ministries and
the regional and local administrations were inadequately
prepared for the reform (Table 3). Traditionally they had
had a narrow scope of responsibilities, often limited to
managing the relationship with the unionized workforce,
ensuring compliance with national/provincial policies on
recruitment and deployment of personnel, and organiz-
ing continuing education activities [56]. The personnel
attached to these departments generally had limited or no
human resources development training [30,57].
The tasks required by the reform overstretched the capac-
ity of these units. Included among these tasks were: the
development of new organizational structures, defining
new job descriptions, reassigning responsibilities and
designing new reporting systems, establishing perform-
ance evaluation methods and assisting all decentralized
units to carry out similar duties in their jurisdictions.
The decentralization of personnel often unveils rivalries
and discontent among personnel who feel unfairly
treated. All these issues need to be addressed, negotiated
and resolved; and most human resources units were ill-
prepared to lead the process [56]. For example, when the
health system in Bolivia was decentralized, the salaries for
several workers in Santa Cruz were delayed for months.
Costa Rica introduced performance-based contracts
between the Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de
Seguro Social) and the health units, but according to a
senior executive of the Ministry of Health, the targets were
set at minimum levels and some units decreased their
level of production [personal communication with the
authors].
The mismatch between the abilities of the workforce and
the needs of the system documented in the 1980s still pre-
vails. The lack of coordination between training institu-
tions and employers is at the root of the problem, along
with weaknesses in the regulation of health professions
and the dominance of physician's groups on the policy
making process.
According to Bach [56], shortages of personnel trained in
disciplines such as primary health care, health economics,
public health, health communication, health education,
nutrition, and environmental engineering continue to
severely limit the possibilities for improving the quality
and efficiency of the health care system. Only in very few
instances has reform included the human resources devel-
opment activities to address these issues. For example,
Costa Rica trained multifunctional teams for their lowest-
level facilities and promoted the training of general doc-
tors instead of specialists [58]. The National Autonomous
University of Mexico modified its curriculum to promote
family medicine; it introduced public health concepts and
interdisciplinary experiences around issues related to pro-
moting the health and wellbeing of the elderly and pro-
tecting workers from occupational hazards [59].
In most countries, managerial positions were traditionally
given to physicians with little or no management training
[55]. The neoliberal reforms require managers and staff
with experience in specific dominions such as insurance,
capacity to write contracts and enforce them, ability to
monitor performance, knowledge of performance-based
reimbursement systems, and expertise in health services
research to evaluate progress. Decentralization to the state
and municipal levels generates the need for even more
managers, and countries that have given autonomy to
hospital executives to manage their human and financial
resources face additional challenges. With the exception
of Chile, countries in the region had limited expertise in
private health insurance [60]; Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Mexico and Venezuela engaged expensive
foreign technical assistance to develop performance-based
contracts and management information systems.
The promoters of the reforms recognized the need for
good managers but, because they had heavily criticized
the public sector and questioned its role, it was difficult to
recruit qualified staff into managerial positions and, in
turn, it was difficult for those recruited to motivate and
retain qualified staff [56,57]. Most health reform projects
included management training.
The Pan American Health Organization [61] evaluated 15
such training programs and concluded that the training
did not change the performance of the systems and that
for only two projects was management capacity improved.
Table 3: Inadequately trained personnel
a. Human resources units are not adequately staffed, especially to 
manage change.
b. Lack of management experts, especially experts in insurance 
systems and contract managers.
c. Insufficient numbers of people trained in primary health care and 
public health related fields.
d. Training centers unable to produce personnel to operate the 
reformed health system.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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The reasons for the failure included: difficulties in recruit-
ing trainers; inability of the local universities to respond
to the needs of the projects; inappropriate selection of
training participants; conflict between project units and
the ministries of health; political interference; and the
absence of a human resource development plan. Theoret-
ically the deficiencies in formal training can be corrected
with supervision and continuing education activities, but
this did not occur in Latin America. The authors of the
report emphasize the need for countries to develop com-
prehensive human resources development plans to ensure
the efficacy and sustainability of the training programs.
After having spent millions of dollars in training and
infrastructure, the region's capacity to manage contracts is
still limited [62], and when contracts are in place, they are
expensive to administer and the legal system is insuffi-
ciently developed to enforce them. In Colombia, most
public hospitals were unable to compete with the private
sector and are now bankrupt [63]. Poor management in
decentralized entities has been considered one of the
main reasons for the decentralization failure [64,65].
Faulty reform implementation process
Countries in the region used a top-down approach to
define and implement reform. The implementation was
often led by a handful of top health executives, newly cre-
ated reform offices, the political elite and international
agencies, which in turn contracted for the technical assist-
ance of international consultants and universities closely
aligned with the neoliberal ideology of the World Bank. In
general, there was little interest in involving professional
associations, unions or even local universities in this
process [2,56] (Table 4).
In Costa Rica the labor unions were involved initially in
the reform, but their influence was undermined by the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank,
which adopted a more closed, centralized decision-mak-
ing style [58]. According to a top executive of the Ministry
of Health in El Salvador, the group preparing the reform
operated in secret, and in his view, the secretive process
was desirable because if health workers had participated
they would have created obstacles to its implementation
[66]. Indeed, it appears likely that the labor unions and
professional associations in this country and many others
would not have approved neoliberal reforms.
Some authors have offered a different interpretation of the
exclusion of the workforce and assert that it was the com-
plexity of the human resources issues and the need to
involve many players (the ministries of education, labor,
finance and health, and professional associations and
unions) in their solutions that led reform promoters to
ignore the labor force and other stakeholders [30].
Regardless of the underlying motivation, the secrecy that
surrounded the process of defining and implementing the
reforms produced rumors, confusion and hostility against
the reform among civil servants and professional groups
[30,39,67,68]. The objectives and processes by which
reforms were introduced were never made clear; and often
the reforms were perceived as responding more to ideo-
logical concerns of international organizations, in partic-
ular the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, than to the needs, resources and sociopolitical real-
ities of the countries [57]. The president of the Medical
Association of El Salvador said that his association had
tried to obtain information about the reform for over a
year and that all his knowledge was based on "rumors and
guesswork that led nowhere" [66].
In addition, health reformers did not consider the strate-
gies and resources needed during the transition and early
stages of implementation; such as allocating new financial
resources and establishing clear communication chan-
nels. In addition, as discussed in the previous section, the
reforms failed to adequately train managers who could
lead the transition to a new management system [40].
Inadequate regulatory system to ensure high-
quality training and health providers
The need for regulation increases in health systems where
the private sector plays a prominent role. In Latin America
it was not until the early 1990s, largely as a consequence
of the health reforms, that health policy makers became
aware of the urgency to regulate the health system. A reg-
ulatory system includes adequate regulations, the institu-
tions to enforce them, and a judicial system that ensures a
timely response in the event of conflict. Enforcing regula-
tions is important to guarantee that trained personnel
provide safe and adequate services (Table 5).
Prior to the reforms, the regulatory systems were poorly
developed and, when they existed, they were not tailored
to the needs of consumers and enforcement was very lim-
ited [69]. For instance, the licensing of providers was a
purely bureaucratic formality with no assessment of qual-
ifications. The patronage and bossism observed in many
Table 4: Faulty reform implementation process
a. Lack of involvement of professional associations and labor unions in 
the definition of the reform.
b. Secrecy surrounding definition of the reform raises suspicions 
among those responsible for implementing it and predisposes them to 
resist the changes.
c. Lack of transition plan.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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countries were further expressions of regulatory deficien-
cies [70].
The number of medical schools has grown spectacularly
in the last two decades and, in most countries, there were
no mechanisms to ensure the quality of the training insti-
tutions or to test the abilities of the graduates. The number
of medical schools in Chile grew by 68% between 1992
and 2000, in Peru the growth was also by 68%, in Argen-
tina by 61% and in Brazil by 21%. The growth occurred
mainly in the private sector [71]. Costa Rica had no pri-
vate universities until the 1970s; now there are 70, several
of which train health professionals [72].
By its very nature the regulation of the health profession
relies heavily on the opinions of professionals and espe-
cially on physicians, who in turn place a great value on
their autonomy and have had little interest in responding
to social and political demands [55]. Medical associations
have traditionally opposed health reforms and have had a
very strong influence on health policy-making
[29,66,73,74].
The dominance of physicians has alienated other profes-
sions such as therapists, nurses, pharmacists, optometrists
and psychologists [75]. For example, in Chile the govern-
ment proposed to train and use more optometric techni-
cians, but medically trained ophthalmologists opposed
the proposal. After a long negotiation process involving
ophthalmologists, optometric technicians, insurance
companies, universities, parliamentary representatives
and consumers, an agreement was reached. The four-year
trial period allows optometric technicians to expand their
scope of practice while medical schools take in more oph-
thalmologists for training [58].
The regulation of the health professions has a long way to
go in Latin America, and it is probably impossible to
establish sustainable regulatory mechanisms in the
absence of political and judicial reforms; for the system to
work, it needs to free itself from political interference [70].
Some argue that the separation between professional
associations and licensing bodies [76] must be increased,
and there is general agreement that the perspective of the
general public [75] must be included.
Consequences of the health reform on human 
resources
Bach [56], Brito et al. [77], Dussault and Dubois [78], Rig-
oli and Dussault [41] have identified human resources
issues as the main obstacle for the success of the reforms.
The neoliberal health reforms did not solve the workforce
problems that had previously been identified, and created
additional ones that have had a negative impact on the
health systems (see Table 6).
The implementation of the reforms has been uneven in
the Latin American region. Technical, logistical, political
and financial problems have surfaced everywhere. While
most countries decentralized, a few – such as Colombia
and Chile – managed to significantly expand private
insurance and, with the exception of Brazil, very few have
engaged in large contracts with private sector providers.
The most salient feature has been significant changes in
hiring modalities. In Brazil there are 15 different types of
contract arrangements [30] and in Peru the need to
expand service coverage led to hiring 10 000 health pro-
fessionals (physicians, nurses and technicians) between
1992 and 1996 under temporary contracts without social
security; by the late 1990s about 12% of the health work-
ers did not have social security [77]. Health workers in
Ecuador have suffered wage reductions, in Mexico with
decentralization the states have increasingly hired tempo-
rary workers [47], and in Argentina there has been a rise
in precarious contracts, even fraudulent ones, such as full-
time jobs under the label "autonomous professional"
[30].
Another important result of the reform is the surge of mul-
tiple jobs, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador,
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and to a lesser degree Chile [30];
that has caused stress and dissatisfaction among
physicians.
A survey of nurses conducted in Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia and Mexico [44] revealed that the reforms increased
stressful conditions at work, job dissatisfaction, insecurity
Table 5: Inadequate regulatory framework to ensure the quality 
of professionals and the performance of the sector
a. Limited quality controls in training institutions.
b. Physician-dominated field that precludes other professional groups 
from being recognized as health care providers within the official 
health care system.
c. Limited accreditation of health care professionals.
Table 6: Consequences of the health reform on human 
resources
a. Working conditions have worsened, and talented workers migrate 
to the private sector or to other countries.
b. The motivation of workers has deteriorated.
c. Productivity and quality may have deteriorated.
d. The uneven ratio of specialists to primary physicians has not 
changed.
e. The uneven distribution of personnel (hospital and urban bias) 
persists.
f. Corruption has not decreased.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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from flexible contracts, malpractice concerns, inter-insti-
tutional migration, and new bureaucratic tasks for which
nurses were not trained. The nurses specifically men-
tioned that they needed to do more work in less time with
fewer staff; and complained about excessive paperwork,
including billing, and about having less time for direct
patient care than before the reform. One of the nurses
who participated in the study said "Patients may feel that
we really don't care that much about them, because we
just don't have enough time to spend with them and really
know what is going on [44]." In a different survey, nurses
who had gone through reform restructuring held more
negative perceptions of patient care than those who had
not; and they also expressed a higher desire to unionize
[41].
Furthermore, according to the Tavistock Group [79]
"cooperation throughout a health care system can pro-
duce better outcomes and much greater value for individ-
uals and for society. Such cooperation requires agreement
across disciplinary, professional and organizational lines
about the fundamental ethical principles that should
guide all decisions in a truly integrated system of health
care delivery." If this statement is correct, by fragmenting
the system through privatization and decentralization,
and by introducing competition among health profes-
sionals, the neoliberal health reforms have compromised
the quality of care.
Similarly, one of the basic principles of neoliberal reforms
– that the efficiency of the system will increase by using
flexible contracts and rewarding productivity – is not sup-
ported by the data. The World Bank conducted an evalua-
tion of civil service reforms in 15 countries and
concluded: "None of the cases reviewed so far have
revealed any empirical evidence that the Civil Service
Reform and related Technical Assistance Loans have suc-
ceeded in fostering the needed change in work attitudes,
ethics and organizational culture that could lead to greater
efficiency/productivity in the civil service" [1].
Research has also uncovered problems with using per-
formance-based payment schemes. For example, in health
it is often difficult to establish who is responsible for the
outcome. Costa Rica implemented a pilot project in Barva
de Heredia in which physicians received an incentive
based on productivity, but this was not extended to the
nurses and the other clinic staff [80]. The project increased
the costs to the system without increasing the productivity
of physicians or the quality of care, and as a result the gov-
ernment halted its plans to extend the model to other
health facilities.
Health providers can also manipulate the information to
maximize their benefits rather than the well-being of the
patients; and substandard working conditions rather than
workers' action may be responsible for a poor outcome
[81]. Mexican providers opposed a malpractice evaluation
system because they did not want to be held liable for
errors due to equipment deficiencies and lack of supplies
[42]. Health workers in Costa Rica feared that the focus on
productivity compromises the commitment to patients
[58] and discourages the provision of services that require
extra time, such as health education [2,55] and mental
health counseling.
Establishing a valid and reliable merit-pay system is
extremely complicated; placing too much emphasis on
material rewards may displace more intrinsic motivators
such as the pleasure of doing good, or caring for the
patient. Bennet and Franco [1] even suggest that loyalty to
the organization may decrease as the worker becomes
aware of more lucrative opportunities with other
employers. This could have serious consequences.
Attracted by NGOs and the higher salaries of private hos-
pitals, the most talented public servants could leave the
public sector. Others raised questions about the sustaina-
bility of these strategies. In Brazil, productivity-based pay-
ment systems resulted in increased productivity, but the
increase was not sustained over time and created compe-
tition among workers who were expected to collaborate
[82]. For an interesting discussion on incentive systems
and motivation in a different context, see Le Grand [83].
There is a belief among neoliberal economists that private
sector workers are more productive and less corrupt than
public employees. Recent hospital studies confirm that
because of fear of termination, absenteeism is less fre-
quent among non-tenured physicians hired through
short-term contracts than among civil servants, but short-
term contracts have not increased commitment to the
institution [84]. Corruption continues to be pervasive in
both private and public hospitals, and productivity differ-
ences between the private and public hospitals have not
been documented [85]. Costa Rica has attempted to
reduce the waiting lists by contracting for the provision of
services with private groups, under the condition that the
recipient of the contract is someone not working for the
clinic that makes the referral, a condition that is often vio-
lated [72].
Decentralization can also be seen as a transfer of financial
responsibilities from central government to local authori-
ties, which has the potential to affect wages and job stabil-
ity [39] and increase inequity. Poor local authorities
cannot compete with the conditions of employment
offered by wealthier municipalities and have difficulties
in attracting personnel. In a decentralized system it is
more difficult to structure career ladders, especially for
workers who choose to locate in rural areas [81]; andHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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decentralization can also exacerbate forms of patronage
and political domination. The experience in many coun-
tries has proven that it is more difficult to resist the polit-
icization of decision-making when health managers
interact with local political leaders without central con-
trols [46,57,70].
In decentralized health systems, particular attention needs
to be paid to establishing good coordination among those
responsible for the vertical program at the central level,
the decentralized administrative units, and the clinical
staff. The absence of good coordination may result in
health workers' reporting to two supervisors: the person
responsible for the vertical program and the supervisor of
the health facility or region, as is the case in Mexico [47].
In sum, in the majority of Latin American countries, the
neoliberal reforms have not made the health delivery
model more responsive to the needs of the community;
have not increased the productivity of health workers;
have had a negative impact on working conditions and
staff motivation; appear to have further compromised the
quality of care; and have had a limited impact on the
capacity to regulate the health professions and training
institutions.
Discussion
More recent studies suggest that many of the old work-
force problems remain unresolved [56,70,86,87]. Even
the World Bank, which promoted the reforms, has finally
recognized [88] that the neoliberal strategies are not hav-
ing the desired impact. The Bank questions the perform-
ance of the private sector and highlights the need to find
the institutional arrangements and policies that best
respond to local conditions and resources.
Health reform provided a perfect opportunity to promote
and encourage workforce improvement. Prerequisites for
the progress of such processes are political will, effective
relationships between the educational and service-provid-
ing institutions, and the open collaboration of profes-
sional groups. However, the reforms had the opposite
effect. The neoliberal orientation challenged the use of
conventional regulation strategies because, by encourag-
ing professionals to seek their own interest instead of the
interests of society as a whole, it questioned whether soci-
ety and regulatory bodies could continue to trust and have
faith in the criteria expressed by health professionals.
Human resources account for the lion's share of health
budgets, and poor performance had been identified as the
main constraint to efficiency, quality of services and user's
satisfaction. The values that guided the neoliberal reform
and the privatization and decentralization initiatives
worsened the problems affecting the Latin American
workforce and added new challenges. The reform imple-
mentation process was also responsible for the failures.
The promoters of the neoliberal health reforms underesti-
mated the importance of involving professional organiza-
tions and unions in the planning and implementation of
the reform efforts, raising suspicion and resistance among
organized health workers. In addition, the reforms were
designed in secret and implemented using a top-down
approach. The only significant advance in human
resource development in the last 10 years is the increased
interest in strengthening the capacity to regulate training
institutions and practitioners.
Solving the problems that affect human resources is no
easy task, and probably the solutions are different for each
country; ignoring the problems and hoping that the mar-
ket will resolve them is a recipe for failure. Managing
change is very complex; embarking on reform without
having secured the collaboration of the workforce and
ensuring the availability of sufficient qualified staff is
irresponsible.
The exclusion of the organized labor force from reform
discussions is indefensible; the collaboration and motiva-
tion of the health workers is essential to the reform, and
the leaders of the organized groups can assist in informing
and aligning the workforce [40,89].
Policy changes requiring a different skill mix of health per-
sonnel require careful planning because there is a signifi-
cant time lag between deciding that there is a need to train
additional professionals and having them available. For
example, a 10% rise in the number of students in a medi-
cal school produces only a 2% increase in the supply of
doctors 10 years later [78]. Most countries did include a
training component, but as mentioned earlier it was
insufficient, and part of the problem was that the reform
implementation was rushed, without the benefit of field-
testing the underlying theories, gathering evidence on the
appropriateness of the strategies, or learning from the
reform experience.
One thing that reforms could have done was to support
interventions that, independently from the reform, some
countries had designed to overcome workforce weak-
nesses. Some interventions were national programs, oth-
ers were pilot projects, and there were also experimental
projects. The following are examples of these autoch-
thonous interventions.
To solve the urban-rural gap and improve equity, most
ministries of health in the region created the obligatory
rural health service known as pasantía or servicio social
that requires physicians to spend one year in a rural healthHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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center prior to graduation or immediately after receiving
their degree [35].
A few social security institutes have also found ways to
reduce health inequities; such is the case of the Mexican
and Ecuadorian Institutes of Social Security (IMSS and
IESS). IMSS organized COPLAMAR, an extensive primary
and secondary care program for poor rural populations,
which brought general practitioners and specialists to
rural areas. The Ecuadorian program known as Seguro
Social Campesino offered primary care services for rural
dwellers and, when needed, hospitalization at the Ecua-
dorian Social Security Institute; this program aimed at
reducing the rural-urban gap in a country of which 70% of
the population then lived in the rural areas [90].
Mexico created a training program for traditional mid-
wives who worked in dispersed rural populations; the
objective of the program was to enhance the quality of
their services and reduce maternal and infant mortality
[91]. The Ministry of Health of the Dominican Republic,
in an effort to increase health equity, trained and
deployed more than 5 000 health promoters in rural cent-
ers. The promoters periodically visited every rural house-
hold to monitor infant growth, promote nutrition and
sanitation, and assist in immunization campaigns [35].
Costa Rica attracted the world's attention with the Open
Walls Hospital, a program that required the specialists of
a regional hospital to schedule – when needed – weekly
visits to dispersed rural populations. The program also
intended to convey the message to specialists that they
were not different from other health workers and had an
obligation to serve poor rural dwellers even when doing
so would involve personal inconvenience [80].
To enhance the professional status of primary care practi-
tioners, reduce referrals, and improve quality of care,
IMSS created many positions in the specialty of family
physician, forcing the medical profession to recognize the
status of the new specialty. Colombia's Ministry of Health
sent nurses to a graduate health education program taking
advantage of a US fellowship program in order to diversify
the human resource composition of the Ministry.
Some of these projects were successful; this was the case of
family physicians and COPLAMAR in Mexico. However,
the first 14 Mexican states that decentralized in the 1980s
dismantled the program, transferring it to the states'
departments of health to create the state health system,
and the quality of rural health deteriorated rapidly [92].
Others function poorly, as is the case of the compulsory
year of social service in all the countries where it was
established. Similarly, the health promoters program in
the Dominican Republic suffered from insufficient train-
ing, lack of continuous education, absence of efficient
supervision, and poor remuneration, comments that can
be extended to all health promoter programs of the
region. The Seguro Social Campesino has suffered from
inadequate financing, and plans to extend it to the entire
rural population have been placed on permanent hold.
Other programs were discontinued because of indiffer-
ence and lack of support from policy makers. Thus, the
Hospital without Walls ceased after all Ministry of Health
hospitals were transferred to the Social Security Institute.
Due to budgetary problems, the Colombian Ministry of
Health did not employ the health educators on their
return from graduate school.
The health reforms would have provided a perfect oppor-
tunity to support and strengthen many of these and other
autochthonous interventions. A proper course of action
would have been to evaluate the projects that had been
developed locally, identify their strengths and weak-
nesses, and establish their viability and sustainability.
Through trial and error and with appropriate resources
and incentives, many of them are likely to be more effec-
tive and less costly than foreign programs invented by
those who hardly know the realities of developing coun-
tries and are inspired by ideological principles and ques-
tionable economic theories.
There is much more that needs to be done to improve the
training and management of human resources for health,
and very often the solutions depend on the collaboration
of a wide range of stakeholders such as those who produce
health workers, those who employ them, those who pay
for their services, those who negotiate working conditions
and those who define the standards of professional
practice. It is no easy task and can be successfully accom-
plished only if there is strong political will, if there is
openness and trust among all stakeholders, and if suffi-
cient resources and time are allocated to this effort. Most
countries of the region have the capacity to find appropri-
ate solutions to the problems they are facing. Dussault
[55] argued that change is possible only on the basis of
shared values, and as we have seen, the values that
inspired the neoliberal reform did not coincide with those
expressed in the Latin American Constitutions and in the
primary health care principles that had guided the devel-
opment of the health sector during the 1970s and 1980s.
As Segall mentioned [4], it is important to recover the
spirit of cooperation among health providers, and there is
a need to take explicit steps to raise their motivation and
patient-centered behavior. Without a motivated work-
force, all other efforts to change the system may be even
counterproductive. Policy makers and administrators willHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/1
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have to explicitly identify strategies that foster collabora-
tion, inner motivation and work ethics, and this may
require abandoning the market orientation of the neolib-
eral reforms and embracing the values that inspired the
primary health care movement.
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